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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to suggest a pragmatic explanation for some of the morphological 
changes that occurred in the evolution of the preterite of both weak and strong verbs from 
Old English to Middle English. In order to do so, this work will be based on Relevance 
Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002b) and will focus only on 
the weakening and subsequent loss of person and number inflections, as well as on the 
processes of analogical extension and paradigm levelling.  
KEY WORDS: Relevance Theory, verb morphology, preterite, conceptual/procedural meaning, 
explicatures. 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
El propósito del presente artículo es sugerir una explicación pragmática de algunos de los 
cambios morfológicos que ocurrieron en la evolución del pretérito de los verbos débiles y 
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fuertes del Inglés Antiguo al Inglés Medio. Para ello, este trabajo se basa en la Teoría de la 
Relevancia (Sperber y Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson y Sperber, 2002b) y se centra sólo en el 
debilitamiento y posterior pérdida de las desinencias de persona y número, así como en los 
procesos de extensión analógica y nivelación de los paradigmas. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Teoría de la Relevancia, morfología verbal, pretérito, significado 
conceptual/procedimental, explicaturas. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In much of the existing literature in historical linguistics the morphological changes 
undergone by verbs in their evolution from Old English to Middle English [henceforth OE 
and ME, respectively] are usually explained in formal terms (Baugh & Cable, 1993; Barber, 
1993; Burrow and Turville-Petre, 1996; Ekwall, 1980; Fennell, 2001; Fernández Cuesta and 
Rodríguez Ledesma, 2001; Freeborn, 1992; García García, 2001; Görlach, 1991, 1997; 
Horobin and Smith, 2002; Lass, 1992; McMahon, 1994; Moore, 1968; Pyles and Algeo, 
1982; Trask, 1996). Those changes are part of a general shift from a more synthetic language, 
in which grammatical relationships within and between phrases or clauses were expressed 
through inflections, to a more analytic language, in which those relationships became largely 
expressed by word-order and prepositions. However, as Horobin and Smith (2002: 90) 
emphasise, ME cannot be said to have become a purely analytic language, but to be in an 
intermediate position on the synthesis/analysis cline.  
The two most important changes that occurred in the evolution of the morphology of 
the preterite from OE to ME are the weakening and subsequent loss of person and number 
inflection, and the analogical development of some verbal forms. On the one hand, in order to 
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account for the factors intervening in the former process, reference is normally made to the 
phonetic or syntactic changes that affected the linguistic system. On the other hand, as 
regards the latter change, it is normally explained as the result of an irregular tendency that 
produced regularity in paradigms, which McMahon (1994) calls systematic analogy.  
However, little or no mention is made to the cognitive factors that could have 
influenced these changes. It must be pointed out that the aim of this work is not to deny the 
validity and correctness of any previous account of these morphological changes coming 
from the field of historical linguistics, but to suggest a complementary pragmatic approach 
which could contribute to a better and more accurate understanding of the cognitive factors 
that could have favoured those changes. In order to do so, this paper will be based on the two 
main ideas proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) and Wilson and Sperber (2002b) 
that underlie most of the research on grammar under the Relevance Theory [RT henceforth] 
framework, namely, their “[…] proposal of a balance between interest and effort, which 
guides hearers in the selection of a (first and only) appropriate interpretation of utterances, 
together with the importance of [their] proposal of an enrichment of the logical form of 
utterances in the search for this interpretation […]” (Yus Ramos, 1997: 237). 
A wider picture of the morphological changes undergone by the verb could be 
obtained if what happened in the present indicative and in the subjunctive mood were to be 
also considered. However, this paper will focus only on the morphological evolution of the 
preterite indicative tense, since an analysis of the changes occurred in the subjunctive would 
have to address other issues that go well beyond its scope1. The structure is as follows: firstly, 
the formation of the preterite in both OE and ME will be briefly presented; then, a short 
summary will be offered of the most common explanations provided by the field of historical 
linguistics of the aforementioned changes. Obviously, it should be borne in mind that those 
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changes took some time to develop, that they did not affect all the regions in which English 
was spoken in the same way, and that there were usually great differences between the oral 
realisations of the language, more open to innovations, and its written realisations, more 
stable or conservative. When examples are given, they will be taken from the dialect of 
Wessex, which is the variety of the bulk of written OE records and the literary standard in the 
Anglo-Saxon period2. After this, the basic postulates of RT (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; 
Wilson and Sperber, 2002b) will be introduced, and, finally, a proposal to understand those 
changes from an RT viewpoint will be suggested.  
 
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF INDICATIVE PRETERITE FROM OE TO ME 
 
2.1. THE FORMATION OF THE PRETERITE IN OE 
 
The inflection of the verb in Germanic languages was much simpler than it was in 
Indo-European [IE henceforth] times, and, at the same time, in OE it was much simpler than 
in Germanic. OE had three moods (indicative, subjunctive and imperative), and it also had 
the usual distinctions for the two numbers (singular and plural) and for the three grammatical 
persons. However, OE only distinguished two simple tenses by means of inflection: a present 
and a past. As was the case with other Germanic languages, it also had two types of verbs: 
weak and strong.  
On the one hand, weak verbs formed the past tense by adding a dental suffix to the 
verb stem, which was realised as -ede, -ode, or –de3. This suffix was derived from the 
grammaticalisation of the Proto-IE verb *dhe/dho (“to do”, “to put”), which was added to 
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verbal stems to mark the past tense (e.g. Horobin and Smith, 2002: 115; García García, 2001: 
203; Lass, 1992: 125). There were three classes of weak verbs in OE. The first included those 
verbs with the infinitive ending in -an (-ian after [r]) and with the preterite ending –(e)de. 
The second class contained verbs whose infinitive ended in -ian and with the preterite ending 
-ode. The third class grouped verbs such as habban, libban, secgan, or hycgan. The 
following table illustrates the three different classes of weak verbs (Pyles and Algeo, 1982: 
125): 
 
Table 1: OE weak verbs 
 INFINITIVE PRETERITE PAST PARTICIPLE 
Class I fremman fremede gefremed 
 
ferian ferede gefered 
 
þencan þohte4 geþoht 
Class II endian endode geendod 
Class III habban hæfde gehæfd 
 
On the other hand, strong verbs formed their past tense by means of gradation or 
ablaut in the stem vowel. This variation in the stressed vowel derives from alternations 
already present in Proto-IE, based on a pattern according to which front vowels were used to 
indicate present or progressive aspect and back vowels marked past tense or perfect aspect 
(e.g. García García, 2001: 194-198; Horobin and Smith, 2002: 114). In OE strong verbs, the 
first and third person singular had the same stem vowel, whereas the second person singular 
and all the persons of the plural had another vowel. These verbs are normally grouped in 
seven general classes5. While there are variations within each class, they may be illustrated 
by the following table (adapted from Pyles and Algeo, 1982: 126-127), which shows their 
main parts: 
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Table 2: OE strong verbs 
 INFINITIVE PRETERITE 
SINGULAR 
PRETERITE 
PLURAL 
PAST 
PARTICIPLE 
Class I ridan rad ridon geriden 
Class II     (1) cleofan cleaf clufon geclofen 
                  (2) scufan sceaf scufon gescofen 
 
ceosan ceas curon gecoren6 
Class III   (1) drincan dranc druncon gedruncen 
                  (2) helpan healp hulpon geholpen 
                  (3) feohtan feaht fuhton gefohten 
Class IV beran bær bæron geboren 
Class V     (1) metan mæt mæton gemeten 
                  (2)     gifan geaf geafon gegifen 
Class VI   (1) faran for foron gefaren 
                  (2) standan stod stodon gestanden 
Class VII  (1) cnawan cneow cneowon gecnawen 
 
feallan feoll feollon gefallen 
                  (2) hatan het heton gehaten 
 
slæpan slep slepon geslæpen 
 
As regards the endings for the preterite, to both weak and strong verbs were added the 
inflectional morphs shown in the following table (adapted from Görlach, 1997: 67): 
 
Table 3: OE endings for the preterite 
PERSON WEAK VERBS STRONG VERBS 
1sg. -e Ø 
2sg. -est -e 
3sg. -e Ø 
Pl. -on -on 
 
 
2.2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PAST TENSE IN ME 
 
In ME verbs continued to be divided into strong and weak, since the gradational 
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necessary conditions for rhotacism to take place. 
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distinctions expressed in the stem vowels of strong verbs were fully preserved. However, 
three great changes took place in the preterite in this historical period of the evolution of 
English:  
a) The vowels of the endings were weakened and the endings levelled as a result of a 
general tendency to fix the lexical stress on the first syllable of words, which drew 
attention away from the final syllables, where inflectional information was to be 
found. Thus, final [n] disappeared and vowels became [ə], which would also 
disappear later on (e.g. Blake, 1996: 150; Burrow and Turville-Petre, 1996: 20-21; 
Fennell, 2001: 101; Fernández Cuesta and Rodríguez Ledesma, 2001; Freeborn, 1992: 
86; García García, 2001: 216; Lass, 1992: 135; Leith, 1996: 118). As Horobin and 
Smith (2002: 132) explain, this tendency had already begun during the Proto-
Germanic period because of linguistic contact with non-IE languages, and was 
increased because of contact with Old Norse [ON henceforth], particularly in the 
North and the North Midlands. In fact, inflectional innovations seem to have always 
been more advanced in those areas where linguistic contact took place, and they 
expanded from there towards the South. The endings added to mark person 
distinctions in ME in the past tense are illustrated by the following table7: 
 
Table 4: ME endings for the preterite 
PERSON WEAK VERBS STRONG VERBS 
1 sg. -e -Ø 
2 sg. -est -e 
3 sg. -e -Ø 
Pl. -Ø/-en/-e -e/-en 
 
An immediate consequence of this process was the development of a more fixed 
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word-order in which the subject tended to precede the verb, so that word-order took 
over the grammatical function of inflection (e.g. Horobin and Smith, 2002: 132). 
Closely related to this, pronoun-differences became even more important in discourse 
terms during ME. Therefore, the pronominal system had to be modified by means of 
the introduction of Scandinavian forms for the third person plural, as there was also a 
certain phonological confusion between the original OE forms for that person in the 
North (Fernández Cuesta and Rodríguez Ledesma, 2001; García García, 2001: 214; 
Horobin and Smith, 2002: 133; Padilla Cruz, 2003). Nevertheless, García García 
(2001: 213) comments that the use of explicit subjects for plural verbs was already 
necessary in OE, and that it had almost become obligatory in the first and second 
person singular. Accordingly, the use of subject personal pronouns might have been 
well extended before the total disappearance of personal endings in the plural in 
Proto-OE. Otherwise, this disappearance would not have been possible because of the 
resulting grammatical ambiguity.  
b) Although some of the verbs maintained the OE four-grade distinction, (as shown in 
Table 5), there was a tendency to use exclusively one or the other of the preterite 
vowel grades. Lass (1992: 131) mentions that this reduction started with the levelling 
of the past singular under the vowel of the first and third person singular, thus setting 
a contrast between the singular and the plural forms. Later on, number opposition in 
the past was eliminated by the selection of the vowel of the older plural or of the 
singular for the whole tense. However, as Pyles and Algeo point out, “The older 
distinction […] was more likely to be retained in the Midlands and the South than in 
the North” (1982: 160). Although, as in the case of the previous change, the Northern 
variety was more innovative, by 1450 the unification of the vowels in the preterite 
was completed in all dialects (García García, 2001: 198; Lass, 1992: 132-133).  
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Table 5: ME strong verbs 
 INFINITIVE PRETERITE 
SINGULAR 
PRETERITE 
PLURAL 
PAST 
PARTICIPLE 
Class I ride(n) rod riden (i)ride(n) 
Class II crepen crep crupen cropen 
Class III finden fond founden founden 
 
helpen halp hulpen holpen 
 
fighten faught foughten foughten 
Class IV teren tar teren toren 
Class V meten mat meten meten 
Class VI faren for foren faren 
Class VII fallen fel felen fallen 
 
hoten het heten hoten 
 
According to Blake (1996: 150), Ekwall (1980: 99) or García García (2001: 198), in 
some cases the preterite singular could take over the vowel of the plural when the 
participle had the same vowel as the preterite plural. Nonetheless, there was little 
consistency: the vowel of the past participle was also extended in some cases to the 
preterite; there were dialectal peculiarities, such as doublets – ran/runnen – for the 
preterite plural (e.g. Burrow and Turville-Petre, 1996: 35; García García, 2001: 198-
202; Lass, 1992: 132), and some verbs were subjected to influence from one class to 
another. For instance, Baugh and Cable (1993: 160-161) exemplify that one of the 
verbs that was influenced by another class is Present-day English [PDE henceforth] 
“to slay”, which in OE had the forms slean-slog-slogon-slægen. This verb would 
have evolved to *slea-slough-slain, but the present tense was reformed from the past 
participle, and its past tense “slew” is due to analogy with other preterites such as 
“blew” or “grew”. Table 6 reflects the levelling of forms within the same class that 
took place in ME (adapted from Görlach, 1997: 73): 
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Table 6: levelling of verbs in ME8 
 OLD ENGLISH  MIDDLE ENGLISH 
Class I risan  risen 
 
ras 
 
ros 
 
rison Ø rosen 
 
gerisen 
 
risen 
Class II ceosan  cesen 
 
ceas 
 
ces 
 
curon Ø cesen 
 
gecoren 
 
coren, cosen 
Class III findan  finden 
 
fand 
 
fond, found 
 
fundon 
 
founden 
 
gefunden 
 
founden 
Class IV beran  beren 
 
bær 
 
bar 
 
bæron Ø beren 
 
geboren 
 
boren 
Class V sprecan  speken 
 
spræc 
 
spak 
 
spræcon Ø speken 
 
gesprecen Ø spoken 
 
c) Finally, there were also cases of hybridisation, since some forms of one strong class 
were transferred to another class, as in “given” and “spoken”, which reflect transfer 
from class IV to class V (Baugh and Cable, 1993: 133; Blake, 1996: 151; García 
García, 2001: 198; Lass, 1992: 133). Besides, the strong conjugation lost some of its 
verbs, for they acquired the dental suffix in the course of ME to form the preterite by 
analogy with the considerably larger group of weak verbs, as in the case of gliden, 
crepen, sheren, meten, aken, or wepen. Other strong verbs were rare in OE or had to 
compete with weak verbs with similar meaning, as stope/stepped, rewe/rowed, 
clew/clawed, holp/helped, (Baugh and Cable, 1993: 158-159; Blake, 1996: 151; 
García García, 2001: 202-203; Lass, 1992: 133). Baugh and Cable (1993: 160) regard 
these changes as a gain because of the difficulty the irregularity of such verbs 
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constituted in the language, and Burrow and Turville-Petre (1996: 31) and García 
García (2001: 198-203) mention that they were due to the fact that new verbs formed 
from nouns and adjectives or borrowed from other languages were regularly 
conjugated as weak. 
 
 
2.3. COMMON EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CHANGES IN THE PRETERITE 
 
The three changes explained in the previous section have often been accounted for 
from a traditional viewpoint “[...] as the result of a highly complex cooperation of sound 
changes, syntactic changes, and analogical changes” (Moore, 1968: 228). However, 
following Leith (1996: 118), it is necessary to distinguish between the internal and external 
causes for these changes.  
 
 
2.3.1. INTERNAL CAUSES 
 
As Leith (1996: 118) comments, it has been rather usual for 19th century and many 
modern philologists and linguists to conceive linguistic change as the result of the inherent 
nature of a language, as if it were an organism that has its own natural tendencies. However, 
modern linguists prefer to consider language as a system that can be reorganised or 
restructured if there are crucial changes that affect it in a serious way.  
Thus, the placement of lexical stress on the initial syllable of words resulted in the 
weakening of inflections, with the subsequent loss of distinctions for grammatical person and 
number (Blake, 1996: 150; Burrow and Turville-Petre, 1996: 20-21; Fennell, 2001: 101; 
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Fernández Cuesta and Rodríguez Ledesma, 2001; Freeborn, 1992: 86; García García, 2001: 
216; Lass, 1992: 135; Leith, 1996: 118), as can be appreciated from a comparison of tables 3 
and 4, where the graphic representations of inflections evidence their phonological 
weakening in the plural forms of strong verbs and their disappearance in weak ones. This 
change was related to the development of a more fixed word-order and the tendency to place 
the subject before the verb, which would become “therapeutic” devices that compensated for 
the weakening and loss of inflections (García García, 2001: 214; Horobin and Smith, 2002: 
133; Padilla Cruz, 2003). As regards the changes based on analogy, they are examples of 
what McMahon (1994: 71) calls systematic analogy. Analogy is an irregular process that 
produces regularity in a paradigm, since it tries to maintain the link between sounds and 
meanings “[...] by keeping sound structure, grammatical structure and semantic structure in 
line, especially when sound change might have made their relationship opaque” (McMahon, 
1994: 70).  
On the one hand, there were cases of analogical extension (McMahon, 1994: 71) in 
those strong verbs that took the dental suffix to form their preterite form (e.g. gliden, 
crepen), and in those verbs that were influenced by others belonging to a different class (the 
case of PDE “to slay”). On the other hand, there were examples of analogical levelling 
(McMahon, 1994: 73), because there were verb stems that were re-organised so as to display 
the same sound, such as ceosan-ceas-curon-(ge)coren, which in ME evolved to cesen-ces-
cesen-coren/cosen. By means of the re-establishment of a sound that had changed during a 
previous stage of the evolution of the language because of rhotacism the semantic 
relationship between the forms of the verb was made clearer (McMahon, 1994: 74; Trask, 
1996: 109). In relation to this, Leith correctly states that “In using the different forms of a 
verb [...] , it is suggested that speakers will be reminded of other verbs which are similar in 
some parts of the pattern, but not others; thus, verbs originally belonging to different verb 
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classes are blended in the mind of the speakers, and new forms for those verbs, based on parts 
of the pattern of vowel changes in other verbs, are created” (1983: 105). 
Nevertheless, Leith (1996: 119) also points out that it is not enough to explain the 
evolution of a language or to account for some of its changes by relying only on the linguistic 
system itself. A more complete approach must deal with other questions and factors that 
might have intervened, such as how or why a particular change takes place or is adopted by 
speakers. In this sense, there are explanations that incorporate the role played by external 
factors such as linguistic contact. 
 
 
2.3.2. EXTERNAL CAUSES 
 
Although some scholars (e.g. Fennell, 2001) have argued that the influence exerted by 
linguistic contact between OE and ON was not deep enough – except in the lexicon, for many 
words were introduced in the English inventory in order to express or distinguish meanings in 
a more precise way – there is a widely extended opinion that contact between these two 
languages was crucial for the evolution from OE to ME. Thus, Freeborn (1992: 86), Leith 
(1983: 12; 1996: 119), Poussa (1982), Rodríguez Redondo (2001: 410-414) or Tejada Caller 
(1999: 112-144) sustain that the effect of the Viking settlement in the Danelaw must have 
been an important factor that hastened the abandonment of the OE inflectional differences. 
The new forms that originated in that area and along its borders would have been gradually 
spread in popular speech. 
These authors believe that in a contact situation where the dialects or varieties spoken 
were of similarly low prestige and largely unused in writing, it was quite likely that the two 
languages were mutually intelligible, that speakers were bilingual or used a kind of pidgin to 
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communicate. This pidgin would have been a rather simplified version of one or the other 
language, to which speakers resorted for specific purposes. In those conditions, there would 
have been pressure to level inflections, above all, in contexts where verbal interaction had to 
be fast and efficient. As Rodríguez Redondo (2001: 415) explains, the simplification of the 
inflectional system in the Danelaw would have caused a great syncretism, so that several 
grammatical functions were encoded through one single linguistic element which, therefore, 
became polyfuncional. This process of simplification affected those linguistic elements that 
were not very important or were regarded as superfluous, for their elimination would not 
hinder verbal understanding. However, those linguistic elements considered important and 
necessary by speakers were still maintained in the system and linguistically encoded.  
On the contrary, Görlach (1990) thinks that the linguistic system resulting from that 
contact situation in the Danelaw and along its borders was neither a pidgin nor a creole. 
Although he considers that these two concepts have not been yet clearly defined and 
distinguished, he believes that a creole normally evolves from a pidgin when speakers acquire 
and retain in a stable way the features of a pidgin, whose range of usage they expand as a 
consequence of nativeness. Instead, he prefers to treat that system as a creoloid that arose 
through the fossilisation of inadequately learnt patterns, with a lower degree of stability than 
that of stable pidgins. The evidence he adduces is that verbs in creoles do not have tense – 
with speaker deixis – but tend to have some features of events and their sequence indicated 
by pre-verbal markers that are never represented by inflectional morphemes. By contrast, ME 
retained the OE tense system and marked tense by means of inflection, making it even more 
explicit in those verbs in which the distinction was in danger of being lost. According to 
Görlach (1990: 76), what happened in the development of English can be explained as a 
reduction of the redundancy inherent in OE, and there was never a drastic break between two 
different linguistic systems, which is the most remarkable feature of pidgins. Although this 
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hypothesis has been adhered to by other authors (e.g. Tejada Caller, 1999), Danchev (1997) 
postulates that ME was not definitely a creole and does not regard the term creoloid 
satisfactory, because these terms are associated with interlanguage at a very early stage of 
second language acquisition. For that reason, he prefers to speak about the existence of 
“creolisation-like processes.”  
Without going into further details about the debate on the real nature of ME, what the 
works of these authors have shown is that the linguistic contact between OE and ON led to a 
morphological simplification that increased the rapidity and facility of verbal interaction. 
However, as Rodríguez Redondo (2001: 416-417) puts it, although verbal understanding was 
made easier by the elimination of many different morphemes, it was at the same time made 
more difficult by the conceptual load projected onto very few linguistic elements. This 
involves a tendency contrary to the principle of iconicity “one form-one function”, and also 
increases considerably the interlocutors’ processing effort because of the different 
interpretations available for a few grammatical elements. Therefore, the progressive loss of 
iconicity had to be offset gradually through the development of other devices that transmitted 
the grammatical information essential for a correct understanding. 
As previously stated, the aim of this paper is to offer a pragmatic interpretation of the 
changes in the preterite in the light of RT (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and 
Sperber, 2002b), not to deny the validity of the explanations discussed so far but because its 
postulates on communication may contribute to a more accurate understanding of the 
cognitive factors that could have underlain the morphological evolution in this verbal tense. 
For this reason, in the following section the most important ideas of RT (Sperber and Wilson, 
1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002b) will be summarised and a proposal in line with them 
will be offered. 
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3. TOWARDS AN RT EXPLANATION OF THE MORPHOLOGICAL   
CHANGES IN THE PRETERITE FROM OE TO ME 
 
3.1. RT AND COMMUNICATION 
 
RT (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002b) does not conceive 
communication as a mere process of encoding and decoding, but as an ostensive-inferential 
process in which the speaker produces an utterance, which is an ostensive stimulus aimed at 
drawing the addressee’s attention towards a particular set of assumptions she wants to 
communicate. In this process, the task of the addressee is to discover what the speaker 
intended to say, what she intended to imply, and her intended attitude to what was said and 
implied (e.g. Wilson, 1993: 337-341). In order to find out what the speaker intended to say, 
the hearer uses his knowledge of the language, his grammatical knowledge, which provides 
him with the range of linguistically possible interpretations of every utterance, although it 
will not tell him the exact interpretation that is intended on any particular occasion.  
Every utterance is seen as communicating a set of assumptions, some explicitly, and 
others implicitly. Therefore, what the speaker intended to say is seen as belonging to the 
explicit side of communication. For the hearer to discover what was said by the utterance, he 
will have to decode its sense, disambiguate any ambiguous expression, assign reference to 
referential expressions, restore any ellipsed material, and narrow down the interpretation of 
vague expressions (e.g. Wilson, 1993: 338). 
In their model, Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) and Wilson and Sperber (2002b) 
envisage utterance interpretation as a two-phase process. The first one is a modular decoding 
phase that provides the linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, i.e. a structured 
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set of constituents that is used in the mental operations taking place during comprehension 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995: 72). This logical form is not fully propositional because its 
truth-value cannot be established. So it must be developed and enriched through an inferential 
process in which the hearer must resort to contextual information until it becomes fully 
propositional. When the hearer obtains a fully propositional form, he is able to construct a 
hypothesis about the speaker’s informative intention, i.e. the set of assumptions she wants to 
make manifest to him. The authors (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995: 181; Wilson and 
Sperber, 1993: 1) argue that the result of this process of enriching a linguistically encoded 
logical form to a point where it expresses a certain proposition is the construction of the 
explicature of the utterance, which is “[…] a combination of linguistically encoded and 
contextually inferred conceptual features” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 182). The lower the 
contribution of contextual information, the more explicit the explicature of an utterance will 
be, and, conversely, the higher the contribution of contextual information, the less explicit it 
will be. Thus, Wilson and Sperber (2002a) distinguish between strong and weak explicatures. 
The identification of the explicatures of an utterance relies heavily on non-demonstrative 
inference, so the hearer has a certain degree of responsibility when he relates the contextual 
assumptions manifest in his cognitive environment. This responsibility and the level of 
(in)determinacy of the explicature of an utterance vary depending on the utterance itself: 
“Explicatures can be weaker or stronger, depending on the degree of indeterminacy 
introduced by the inferential aspect of comprehension” (Wilson and Sperber, 2002a: 619). 
The explicature the hearer has to recover for the correct understanding of an utterance 
must be the one the speaker intended to communicate. In order to do so, he is guided by the 
expectations of relevance the utterance generates. This assumption is captured in the 
Communicative Principle of Relevance, according to which every act of ostensive 
communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance (Sperber and 
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Wilson, 1995: 260). This Principle governs utterance interpretation and makes an individual 
select a particular interpretation from different possibilities. It is grounded on a human 
tendency that makes people search for an optimal level of relevance, which is captured in the 
Cognitive Principle of Relevance: “Human cognition is oriented towards the maximisation of 
relevance” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 260). 
In turn, relevance is a property of ostensive stimuli defined by the authors in terms of 
contextual effects and processing/cognitive effort. On the one hand, contextual effects are 
achieved when newly-presented information interacts in a context of existing assumptions by 
strengthening previous assumptions, contradicting and eliminating them, or yielding 
contextual implications, i.e. information that can only be derived from the interaction of both 
new and old information stored in memory. On the other hand, processing effort is the mental 
effort needed to obtain contextual effects; it depends mainly on two factors: the effort of 
memory to construct a suitable context in which to interpret utterances and the psychological 
complexity of utterances. Some causes for the psychological complexity of utterances can be 
their linguistic structure, or the occurrence of words that are more difficult to process or less 
frequently encountered than others (Wilson, 1993: 345-348). Greater complexity implies 
greater processing effort and detracts from relevance. 
As mentioned above, every utterance can have a variety of interpretations, all 
compatible with the information that is linguistically encoded. However, not all these 
interpretations occur to the hearer simultaneously, since some of them require more effort to 
think up. The order in which the possible interpretations of an utterance can occur to the 
hearer is to some extent predictable, although it is unlikely to be the same for all addressees at 
all times. By virtue of the Communicative Principle of Relevance, a hearer chooses one 
interpretation of an utterance and believes that that is the most relevant interpretation the 
speaker can have communicated because its processing yields some contextual effects that 
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offset his processing effort. In order to select that interpretation, he follows the interpretative 
path that requires the least effort when testing his interpretative hypotheses in order of 
accessibility and he stops when his expectations of relevance are satisfied. Wilson (1999: 
136) calls this the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure. This procedure is also 
applied to the recovery of the implicatures of an utterance, i.e. to the recovery of its implicit 
meaning through a combination of implicated premises and conclusions that the speaker may 
communicate in a stronger or weaker way. 
Once the hearer recovers the explicature of an utterance, he can optionally embed it 
under a higher-level description, such as a description of the speech act performed by the 
speaker or of her attitude towards the propositional content of the utterance. According to 
Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995: 182), an utterance does not only linguistically communicate 
a proposition, but also all its higher-level explicatures. As the authors (Wilson and Sperber, 
1993: 5) exemplify, an utterance such as Mary’s reply in (1) can have several different 
explicatures, as illustrated in (2): 
 
(1) Peter: Can you help me? 
Mary: I can’t. 
(2) a. Mary can’t help Peter to find a job. 
b. Mary says she can’t help Peter to find a job. 
c. Mary believes she can’t help Peter to find a job. 
d. Mary regrets that she can’t help Peter to find a job. 
 
 
3.2. THE CONCEPTUAL/PROCEDURAL DISTINCTION 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, among the primary pragmatic processes the 
hearer must perform in order to recover the explicature of an utterance – processes known as 
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saturation (Carston, 2001; Récanati, 2001)9 – he must disambiguate the speaker’s utterance, 
for in most cases the underlying syntactic structure can have a wide array of semantic 
interpretations, all of which are grammatically possible and valid. This disambiguation 
involves, among other things, establishing the temporal relations between the different events 
described by means of the tense of the verbal forms used (e.g. Carston, 1988; Smith, 1990), 
or establishing the relationship between the juxtaposed or co-ordinated clauses in the 
utterance (e.g. Blakemore and Carston, 1999; Carston, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2002a, 2003). 
Furthermore, the hearer must also assign a reference to referential elements such as pronouns, 
which encode a schematic conceptual meaning and a procedural meaning that help him find 
a specific reference (e.g. Blakemore, 1992; Wilson, 1997; Wilson and Sperber, 1993). 
Within the framework of RT (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 
2002b), a very important contribution has been the distinction between conceptual and 
procedural meaning. Utterances express propositions, which are conceptual representations, 
and those propositions have truth conditions. In the inferential phase of comprehension the 
hearer constructs and manipulates those conceptual representations. Thus, as Sperber and 
Wilson (1986, 1995), Wilson and Sperber (2002b) and Blakemore (1987, 1992) argue, 
utterances can be expected to encode two basic types of information: representational and 
computational, or, in other words, conceptual and procedural information. This means, as 
Wilson and Sperber put it, “[...] information about the representations to be manipulated, and 
information about how to manipulate them” (1993: 2).  
A conceptual representation has logical properties, since it enters into entailment or 
contradiction relations, and can act as the input to logical inference rules. But it also has 
truth-conditional properties, since it can describe or characterise a state of affairs. While 
                                               
9
 Primary pragmatic processes are compulsory, whereas secondary pragmatic processes are optional and their 
result is the enriching of some linguistic elements present in the proposition, as in the case of metaphors, 
homonyms, polysemous or synonymous words (Carston, 1996, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Wilson, 1997; Wilson and 
Sperber, 1998). 
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conceptual representations can be brought to consciousness, procedures cannot, since human 
beings do not have direct access to grammatical computations or to the inferential 
computations used in comprehension (Wilson and Sperber, 1993: 16). Moreover, these two 
types of information, as Wilson and Sperber (1993: 2) point out, cross-cut each other, since 
there are truth-conditional constructions that encode concepts, truth-conditional constructions 
that encode procedures, non-truth-conditional constructions that encode procedures, and non-
truth-conditional constructions that encode concepts.  
The class of truth-conditional constructions that encode concepts includes manner 
adverbials such as “seriously” or “frankly”, since they encode concepts which are 
constituents of the proposition expressed by the utterance, and hence contribute to the truth 
conditions of the utterance. The class of non-truth-conditional constructions that encode 
conceptual meaning groups various types of sentence adverbials, in addition to illocutionary 
adverbials such as “seriously” or “frankly” (Ifantidou-Trouki, 1993; Itani, 1990; Tanaka, 
1998), or hearsay particles (Blass, 1989, 1990; Itani, 1990). These elements help the hearer 
recover the speaker’s attitude towards the propositional content of the utterance. Then, they 
encode concepts which are constituents not of the proposition expressed, but of the higher-
level explicatures of the utterance. Among the class of non-truth-conditional constructions 
that encode procedures are discourse connectives such as “so” or “after all”, which encode 
procedural constraints on the implicatures of utterances (Blakemore, 1987, 1988, 1992). 
Finally, within the class of both truth-conditional and procedural expressions Wilson and 
Sperber (1993: 20-21) include personal pronouns: “Pronouns impose constraints on 
explicatures: they guide the search for the intended referent, which is part of the proposition 
expressed” (Wilson and Sperber, 1993: 21). 
As has been observed, Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) and Wilson and Sperber 
(2002b) conceive the explicit side of communication as a terrain where the operation of 
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pragmatics processes is necessary and, therefore, as a field liable for pragmatic research. 
These authors and other RT practitioners have successfully shown that the recovery of 
explicatures is an inferential task previous to the comprehension of utterances in which the 
hearer may act with the help provided by some linguistic elements because of their 
conceptual and/or procedural meaning. As a consequence, it seems adequate to forget the 
twofold distinction between “what is said” and “what is implied” proposed by Grice (1975) in 
favour of a threefold one that differentiates (i) the semantic meaning of an utterance, which 
amounts to its logical form; (ii) what is said, constituted by its explicature, and (iii) what is 
communicated, which includes its implicatures (e.g. Récanati, 1991: 99). 
 
 
3.3. CHANGES IN THE PRETERITE: AN RT ACCOUNT 
 
As mentioned above, a more complete account of any change in the evolution of the 
English language should also incorporate considerations about the pragmatic factors that 
might have underlain or favoured that change. Therefore, in this section an explanation of the 
phenomena that took place in the evolution of the preterite tense from OE to ME is proposed, 
following the theoretical postulates defended by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) and 
Wilson and Sperber (2002b) and the distinctions drawn by Wilson and Sperber (1993). In 
short, this explanation is based on the notion of processing effort as a factor that influences 
the relevance of an utterance, and on the existence of linguistic elements that constrain the 
explicatures of an utterance. 
Regarding the weakening and subsequent loss of person and number inflections 
(tables 3 and 4), it is reasonable to argue that this was possible because there was a loss of 
procedural and schematic conceptual meaning. Accordingly, inflections can be hypothesised 
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to have encoded both a procedural and a schematic conceptual meaning in OE that guided the 
hearer in the primary pragmatic process of search for a referent for the subject that performs 
the action expressed by the verb. Thus, inflections can be said to have imposed constraints on 
the explicatures of the utterances in which they were present in a similar way as personal 
pronouns do in PDE. However, as opposed to personal pronouns, inflections would have 
encoded a more schematic conceptual meaning, for they only contained information about the 
grammatical person and number of the subject. Should they have made distinctions for 
gender as well, they would also have had the same function and status as pronouns.  
Obviously, the placement of the lexical stress on the first syllable of words and the 
subsequent phonological reduction or complete loss of final unstressed vowels and final [n], 
and the development of a more fixed word-order in which subject personal pronouns or noun 
phrases preceded the verb played a crucial role in this loss of procedural and schematic 
conceptual meaning. In fact, García García (2001: 213) comments that the use of an explicit 
subject for plural verbs was already necessary in OE and that it was almost the rule for first 
and second person singular verbs. Moreover, García García (2001: 214), Horobin and Smith 
(2002: 133) and Padilla Cruz (2003) explain that the introduction of Scandinavian forms for 
the third person plural was aimed at solving the phonological confusions that arose between 
the different OE forms for that grammatical person. By doing so, the linguistic system had 
already preserved and secured the possibility of having explicatures recovered in an 
unambiguous way, so it was no longer necessary to encode that procedural and schematic 
conceptual meaning again. What must still be discussed is whether that loss of procedural 
meaning happened in the transition from OE to ME or whether it was already taking place in 
OE. One powerful reason to think that it was happening in OE is that explicit subjects were 
required in that period, so this loss might have occurred then.  
In the same way, the cases of analogical levelling in which the paradigms of some 
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strong verbs were re-organised so as to display the same sound in both the preterite singular 
and plural (OE ceosan-ceas-curon-(ge)coren vs. ME cesen-ces-cesen-coren/cosen) could 
also be accounted for in terms of a loss of procedural and schematic conceptual meaning. In 
OE the different gradational series of the preterite could be postulated to have encoded that 
meaning, since they informed the hearer about the subject of the action expressed by the verb. 
The first vowel of the series would indicate that the subject was either first or third person 
singular, whereas the second vowel of the series would show that the subject was either 
second person singular or one of the three persons of the plural. Thus, the different vowel 
grades also imposed constraints on the recovery of the explicatures of utterances. Since in the 
evolution towards ME personal pronouns acquired that function, it could be sustained that in 
those verbs whose paradigm was levelled so as to unify their stem vowel, the different vowels 
of the gradational series lost their procedural and schematic conceptual meaning.  
In the case of inflections, it has been mentioned that Rodríguez Redondo (2001: 416-
417) maintains that their elimination could have either facilitated or hindered verbal 
understanding because of the conceptual load projected over a limited number of linguistic 
elements. In turn, this could have increased the processing effort hearers had to invest in 
order to select one of the different possible interpretations of those elements. However, the 
changes in the word-order and the placement of explicit subjects before verbs were aimed at 
establishing a satisfactory level of processing effort when recovering explicatures. Moreover, 
if grammatical constituents such as subject pronouns or noun phrases, which allowed the 
recovery of the subject of the utterance, were already present in utterances, it would have 
been redundant to have other elements with similar procedural and schematic conceptual 
meaning that made possible the search for their explicatures. Thus, the retention of verbal 
inflections together with those constituents would have increased the hearers’ processing 
effort, for they would have had to process elements whose grammatical function was 
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practically the same – to restrict the performer of the action – and those elements would have 
been confusing because of the phonological reduction they had undergone. As Sperber and 
Wilson (1986, 1995) and Wilson and Sperber (2002b) contend, utterance interpretation is 
governed by relevance, and relevance is conditioned by contextual effects and processing 
effort. Therefore, the loss of inflections might be understood as a process aimed at 
diminishing or establishing a satisfactory level of processing effort either by not processing 
elements with a similar function or by not having to disambiguate confusing linguistic 
elements. 
Similarly, in the case of the gradational series, it could also be hypothesised that the 
existence of one grade for the two persons of the singular and another for both the second 
person singular and the three persons of the plural in OE preterite would have involved a 
certain degree of psychological complexity for the hearer because both of them were used to 
express the same temporal information. The only feature that distinguished those vowel 
alternations was that they encoded different information about the grammatical person and 
number of the subject of the verb. This would have increased the hearer’s processing effort 
when interpreting the utterances in which those gradational distinctions occurred, which, at 
the same time, detracts from relevance.  
As has been stated, in the change from OE to ME personal pronouns acquired the 
procedural and schematic conceptual meaning that inflections and the series of grades had in 
strong verbs. Consequently, there was no need to encode again those meanings that guided 
the search for the subject of the utterance by means of the different vowels of the stems for 
the preterite. Since that information had been encoded in personal pronouns, the distinction 
between the different grades in the preterite also became redundant. Keeping that distinction 
between the stems for the same tense would have involved more psychological effort when 
processing the utterances, an effort that was unnecessary since the grammatical information 
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they encoded had been undertaken by the personal pronouns. Therefore, the tendency towards 
the reduction of processing effort would have underlain and favoured the levelling of the 
stems in one or the other of the directions indicated above in Table 6. As Ruiz Moneva 
correctly suggests,  
The objective to lead towards the maximum possible understanding with the least 
possible effort would have also lied behind the grammatical simplification. […] The 
aim here would have been to get the most important referential ideas, for which the 
inflectional endings must have been fairly superfluous. The faster elimination of these 
endings would also have been favoured by the oral character of the interchanges, in 
the sense that for this kind of context the effort conveyed in communication, which 
aims at referential content rather than at linguistic or formal accuracy, would be 
relevant. (1997: 190; emphasis in the original) 
Finally, as regards the cases of analogical extensions of those strong verbs that took the 
dental suffix of the weak group to form their preterite form (e.g. gliden, crepen, helpen, 
sheren, meten, aken, or wepen), and those verbs that were influenced by others belonging to 
a different class – an influence that resulted in the formation of the past tense according to a 
different pattern (e.g. PDE “to slay”) – an explanation can be attempted in terms of the same 
tendency towards the reduction of processing effort. On the one hand, as regards the strong 
verbs influenced by forms belonging to other classes of strong verbs, it could be hypothesised 
that this analogy was favoured by the fact that those verbs exerting the influence upon them 
were more frequently used and therefore more frequently processed by the speakers of the 
language. However, this is a rather risky statement which needs the support of further 
empirical research that compares data of occurrence of those verbs in both OE and ME. The 
main problem of such a study is that, obviously, it will have to rely on written records of the 
language, subject to different conventions, and not in naturally occurring verbal interaction.  
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On the other hand, concerning the group of strong verbs that took the dental suffix to 
form the preterite, it could also be argued that the alternation of different vowels in the stems 
of OE strong verbs implied an element of psychological complexity which increased the 
processing effort when interpreting an utterance in which they occurred. The different series 
of vowels no longer constrained the recovery of the explicatures of utterances because 
personal pronouns had acquired that function, and so the only information those grades 
encoded was temporal. As has been shown, OE, like other Germanic languages, resorted to a 
dental suffix to mark temporal distinctions. Moreover, the class of weak verbs was much 
larger than that of strong verbs, and recently introduced verbs derived from nouns followed 
the pattern of weak ones. Therefore, it could be thought that it would have been relatively 
easier for interlocutors to process the temporal information encoded in that dental suffix than 
to process the information encoded in the different grades. Since it was easier for them to 
process the information linguistically encoded in that suffix, it could be concluded that they 
extended the dental suffix progressively to some of the strong verbs.  
However, before concluding, it must be acknowledged that a more complete 
explanation of the changes discussed in this paper from the point of view of RT (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002b) should have also included some 
considerations about the possible contextual effects that hearers might have achieved 
(Wilson, personal communication). Although this was originally outside the scope of this 
paper, such an explanation could be pursued in the following terms.  
It is commonly said that by means of language human beings establish relations of 
identity with the different members of a community that speak it or the same variety. 
Therefore, following Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995), Wilson and Sperber (2002b) and 
Pilkington (2000), it could be thought that when the changes illustrated in this paper were 
present in the speech of a particular group of individuals, hearers could retrieve a whole range 
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of weak implicatures to the effect that (i) the speakers were showing their ascription to a 
particular social group or class, (ii) that they had a certain register that allowed those changes, 
(iii) that they were intentionally deviating from the kind of English regarded as standard or, 
simply, (iv) that their aim was to convey the most important referential ideas, with little or no 
concern for grammatical accuracy. In other cases, those contextual effects could consist of 
the strengthening of other previously held assumptions, some of which might be so weakly 
manifest in the interlocutors’ cognitive environment that they would not be aware of them. 
They could even involve the contradiction of other assumptions, such as that those speakers 
were using a variety of English regarded as correct or that they had a great concern for 
grammatical accuracy. Obviously, these contextual effects depended on the assumptions 
interlocutors entertained, their use as implicated premises or conclusions in inferencial 
reasoning, and on the operation of the Communicative Principle of Relevance.  
Nevertheless, it is too soon to conclude that this was really so, and all that can be done 
at present in relation to this is to make more or less credible hypotheses. What must be noted 
is that the contextual effects that hearers might have obtained could be similar to the poetic 
effects (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 222; Pilkington, 2000) that an individual achieves when 
processing some types of utterances or of discourse. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
As has been observed in this work, RT (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and 
Sperber, 2002b) can be a valid and very useful framework to reach a pragmatic explanation 
of some of the grammatical processes that have taken place in the history of the English 
language. The proposal of a contextual pragmatic enrichment of the logical form of 
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utterances in order to recover their explicatures, together with the proposal of a balance 
between contextual effects and processing effort in order to achieve an optimal level of 
relevance, can contribute to a more accurate and complete understanding of the pragmatic 
factors underlying the evolution of English. Therefore, these valuable insights into 
communication should be incorporated in the field of historical linguistics, which has been 
traditionally dominated by phonologic, semantic or syntactic explanations of linguistic 
changes. If the pragmatic factors operating in utterance production and interpretation were to 
be considered, historical linguistics would undoubtedly gain a more comprehensive view of 
what lies behind some of the changes that have occurred across time. 
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